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ABSTRACT 
In silico medicine is still forging a road for itself in the current biomedical 
landscape. Discursively and rhetorically, it is using a three-way positioning, first, 
deploying discourses of personalised medicine, second, extending the 3Rs from 
animal to clinical research, and third, aligning its methods with experimental 
methods. The discursive and rhetorical positioning in promotions and statements of 
the programme gives us insight into the sociability of the scientific labour of 
advancing the programme. Its progress depends on complex social, institutional 
and technological conditions which are not external to its epistemology, but 
intricately interwoven with it. This article sets out to show that this is the case 
through an analysis of the process of computational modelling that is at the core of 
its epistemology. In this paper I show that the very notion of ‘model’ needs to be re-
thought for in silico medicine (as indeed, for most forms of computational 
modelling), and propose a replacement, in the form of the ‘Model-Simulation-
Experiment-System’ or MSE-system, which is simultaneously an epistemological, 
social and technological system. I argue that the MSE-system is radically mediated 
by social relations, technologies and symbolic systems. We need now to understand 
how such mediations operate effectively in the construction of robust MSE-systems. 
keywords: system medicine, philosophy of modeling and simulation, 
technological mediation. 
1. Introduction 
In silico medicine is still forging a road for itself in the current biomedical 
landscape. Its progress depends on complex social, institutional and 
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technological conditions which are not external to its epistemology, but 
intricately interwoven with it. This article sets out to show that this is the case 
through an analysis of the process of computational modelling that is at the 
core of its epistemology. The analysis is based on combined philosophical and 
empirical methods, with extensive participant observation and immersion in 
computational or in silico modelling for biomedical purposes. This paper 
reports primarily on research conducted in the domain of computational 
cardiac electrophysiology; in the background are research conducted in the 
context of systems biological studies of cancer of the gastrointestinal tract, and 
more broadly in setting out principles for the use of in silico methods in the 
context of clinical trials. In this paper I show that the very notion of ‘model’ 
needs to be re-thought for in silico medicine (as indeed, for most forms of 
computational modelling), and propose a replacement, in the form of the 
‘Model-Simulation-Experiment-System’ or MSE-system, which is 
simultaneously an epistemological, social and technological system. 
In the first section, I discuss the origins of in silico medicine in the 
computational resources of systems biology, and discuss its rhetorical self-
positioning, and my own positioning of it as a technoscientific domain that is 
radically socially and technologically mediated. The main thrust of my analysis 
is to show that in silico medicine, like other forms of technoscience, does not 
consist of a core of hard science, surrounded by facilitating or obstructing 
social relations and technologies; but rather that science, technologies, and 
social relations all play active roles in shaping, defining and characterising the 
domain that is labelled ‘in silico’ medicine. Having introduced these terms in 
the background, I go on to demonstrate how they apply in the analysis of the 
modelling process.  
2. Background  
In silico medicine is the translational edge of systems biomedicine, that takes 
forward and develops further the computational resources associated with systems 
biology, rather than its focus on gaining understanding of complex systems. The 
computational resources of large data bases and supercomputing for data 
processing, modelling and simulation make it possible for science to consider 
systems characterised by dynamic non-linear causality, feedback, and cross-level 
networks of interactions. The programme of research and development that is 
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labelled ‘in silico medicine’, however, comes out of essentially computational 
projects, such as the Virtual Physiological Human (VPH).  
Initially funded by the European Commission ICT panel, the VPH has 
consistently described itself as a platform for developing methodologies and 
technologies ‘to enable collaborative investigations of the human body as a 
single complex system’1. From the outset, potential medical applications were 
highlighted as motivations for investment in this area of technology 
development. From its first paragraph, the VPH White Paper published in 
2005 presents itself as an initiative targeting healthcare, aiming to understand 
physiology not just for itself, but for ‘its dysfunctions (diseases)’, with impacts 
to be felt on diagnosis, treatment, drug and device development. Personalising 
medicine was identified as a potential area for development from the outset. 
Under the remit of the VPH Network of Excellence, the Discipulus project 
produced the Digital Patient Roadmap2, setting out, step-by-step, what the 
VPH vision of personalised medicine would actually entail. ‘4P medicine’, that 
is predictive, preventive, personalised and participatory medicine, is the 
centrepiece of the 2012 vision and strategy (Hunter et al. 2013), which 
culminated with the establishment of the VPH Institute. Developing the ‘ICT 
and computational science framework’ is seen as the main enabler of 4P 
medicine, while the main disablers – apart from scientific and technical 
challenges, are seen as existing ethical, legal, economic and regulatory 
frameworks. For example data sharing and integration face potential breaches 
of privacy and confidentiality; the economic framework in which drug 
development occurs does not easily make space for radically new 
methodologies that may disrupt ownership and patenting structures; and the 
regulations on drug and device safety testing will not easily make way for tests 
conducted in silico rather than on animals.3  
The ongoing VPH programme increasingly identifies itself with in silico 
medicine, and very skillfully positions itself relative to ongoing preoccupations 
in the biomedical arena. We see this in at least three key areas: First, it 
mobilises the discourse of personalised medicine that is closely associated with 
genomic medicine, and proposes to amplify and extend the ‘gene by gene’ 
 
1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_Physiological_Human#cite_note-10 
2 http://www.digital-patient.net/ 
3 These challenges are set out in far more detail in the latest positioning document of the VPH Instititute 
(Viceconti, Henney and Morley-Fletcher 2016). 
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personalisation targeted by genomic medicine through an informational and 
computational infrastructure that would in principle at least, allow for the 
whole organism as system to become the basic ‘unit’ of personalisation. 
Second, as is demonstrated in a document such as the Avicenna In Silico 
Clinical Trials Roadmap4, it reutilises the language of the 3Rs of animal 
research (reduction, refinement and replacement), in the context of clinical 
trials, and thereby creates a parallel between the use of animals and of humans 
in medical research, and the epistemological, pragmatic and ethical themes that 
arise from each.  Third, the rhetorical parallelism of in vivo, ex vivo, in vitro, in 
silico places computational methods and models alongside experimental 
methods and models. This presents computational methods and models as 
further tools in the toolkit of biomedical sciences, along with others that are 
traditionally accepted, and lays the ground for reciprocal engagement between 
computational and experimental methods and models.  
The rhetorical positioning that is evident in in silico medicine does not 
show it to be a kind of manipulative or empty public relations exercise; rather, 
it shows the social shaping and embedding of in silico medicine as it defines 
itself in relation to its potential contribution, capacities and other players in the 
biomedical domain – beginning with its very name5. Each of the three 
positionings are conversation openers with different audiences: funders, policy 
makers, industry partners, clinicians, cross-disciplinary researchers, especially 
experimentalists who do not currently engage with computational methods. 
The rhetoric here is in persuading these audiences to engage with in silico 
medicine, or to give it space enough to prove itself6. Rhetoric is a marker of the 
essential sociability of any sustained scientific programme of research, that 
comes out particularly prominently when that programme is at initial stages, as 
in silico medicine still is. Rhetoric is not an added extra aside from the ‘actual’ 
business of carrying out the research and development, confined to public 
discourse such as manifesto-like statements and position pieces. Instead (as in 
 
4 Viceconti M. et al, ibid.  
5 The label ‘In silico’ medicine is fairly recent; it is associated with other labels such as ‘systems biology’, 
‘systems biomedicine’, ‘computational biology’ or ‘computational biomedicine’, ‘computational medicine’. 
The shifts in naming the set of computational resources, tools and techniques that loosely characterise the 
area mostly depend on the extent to which the labelled programmes are targetting medical audiences.  
6 It goes without saying that there are powerful social, economic and political shapers of the whole 
biomedical domain, but I do not address these here. I am talking about social issues that are closest to 
research cultures of disciplinary and sectorial groupings.  
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other sustained science and technology programmes), it is an indispensable 
element of the core business of in silico medicine, as it is that through which 
sociability expresses itself, shaping the epistemology as well as the 
communication of the programme of in silico medicine.  
In this paper, I concentrate on showing how sociability and epistemology 
combine in the core business of the construction and validation of 
computational models and simulations in order to achieve biomedical ends of 
different types; and how this is sustained through the exchanges that occur 
through technological and symbolic mediation conjoining epistemic and 
communicative aspects of the different knowledge cultures involved in in silico 
medicine. By ‘technologies’ I mean all the different kinds of apparatus, 
instruments, equipment – mechanical, informational and computational -- 
through which scientific research cultures of experimentation, modeling and 
simulation occur; by ‘symbolic’ I mean all the different means through which 
the inputs, outputs, and processes are rendered in order to make them 
communicable – be it through images, graphs, diagrams, information 
visualisations, and the symbolic systems of equations7. Any scientific domain is 
pervasively social, technological and symbolic.  
This brings me to mediation. Technological and symbolic mediation of a 
scientific domain could mean different things: that technologies and symbols 
have an epistemically instrumentalist role as enablers, tools or instruments for 
the research questions and aims of scientists; or that they have a 
communicatively instrumentalist role as the go-betweeners for different 
research cultures coming together and exchanging tokens of their cultures, 
thereby being essential for setting up what Peter Galison calls the trading zone 
(Galison 1997). Clearly technologies and symbols play both these roles in in 
silico medicine. However, both of these roles still make it appear that 
technologies and their associated symbolic systems are somehow external to 
the research. For example, it might seem that as facilitators of knowledge, they 
make attaining knowledge easier (as though research could in principle still go 
on but with more difficulty without them) rather than actively shaping it. On 
this view, they are evidence providers rather than evidence shapers. There is a 
third sense of mediation that is applicable to in silico medicine, as it is to any 
similar scientific programme. This is ‘mediation’ that derives from the sense of 
 
7 On the symbolic and technological systems around equations, see for example studies of mathematicians’ 
work practices in the context of computational biology (Mascord, Jirotka and Carusi 2006). 
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medium as the element in which something, such as an organism, art works, 
science etc., exist and develop, in inter-relationship with the social actors 
engaged in them8. In silico medicine is clearly a domain that is – or is being 
brought into being – through a combination of existing and emerging 
technologies and associated cultures, that define the environment in which it 
unfolds, in which it will thrive, or not. This third sense of mediation radically 
contextualises scientific programmes, positing them as always ‘in the middle 
of’ (in medias res) a social, technological and communicative interplay, which 
shapes the formation, significance, interpretation and weighting of every 
epistemic claim and statement made in it. This third sense of mediation sees 
technologies and symbols in a radically mediating role, whereby they are not 
only tools of the social actors, but active ‘players’ alongside them. This 
includes all the technologies involved in a programme such as that of in silico 
medicine, and not only the computational technologies. Crucially, mediation is 
by the whole range of technologies, experimental, computational and other9, as 
it is by the whole range of social actors, and not only the engineers and 
computer scientists. 
My aim in the rest of this paper is to show how radical mediation applies to 
in silico medicine as a programme of scientific research and development. As 
we know, this is a programme of enormous complexity, and it is difficult to 
generalise across the whole domain. I focus on an emblematic feature of the 
programme: the question of what a model is; and on what I hope will be a 
simple but key example of the interplay between the different cultures, symbols 
and technologies. In Section 1 I show that the distinction between model 
source and target does not work well in these contexts of modelling, and 
propose the notion of Model-Simulation-Experiment (MSE) system; in Section 
2, I show that the process of development of MSE-systems is inherently 
mediated in the ways I have sketched out above; for MSE-systems to become 
robust enough to sustain medical and clinical decisions and consequences, 
there needs also to be awareness of that mediation, and attention paid to it in 
 
8 On this sense of mediation, see Hoel and Carusi (2016). 
9 How broadly these are defined depends on what specific area on is looking at: for example, there are also 
institutional and regulatory technologies.  
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order to ensure its effectiveness, both in the process of model development and 
in the process of translation to actual application10.  
3. From the Target-Source Distinction to the Notion of  
Model-Simulation-Experiment (MSE) 
In silico medicine implies the use of computational approaches, among which 
are data processing techniques and computational simulation. In this paper, I 
focus on the latter, even though there is an overlap between them. 
Computational stimulations could be defined very narrowly as strictly 
consisting of the computational solution of mathematical models. At other 
times, ‘computational simulation’ is shorthand for modelling and simulation. 
In both of these cases, computational simulation stands apart from the 
laboratory experiments, which play two roles: they generate data that are used 
to parameterise the models, and they are used to validate the models. These 
two roles of experiments do not always go together11. But these roles, 
separately or together, often mean that experiments are seen as the target of 
computational simulation (narrowly or broadly defined). Figure 1 schematizes 
such traditional analysis of a modelling set up. 
fig. 1 
 
On this analysis the standard setters for computational simulation are 
experiments; computational simulations are successful or not depending on 
how well they stand in some relationship to experiments. Scientists most 
commonly use the term ‘representation’ for this relationship, but what is meant 
by this can vary across correspondence, description, reproduction, or 
 
10 For a fuller discussion of validation in contexts of application please see Carusi, Burrage and Rodriguez (in 
process). 
11 See Carusi (2014). 
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prediction. Here, I wish to explore the distinction between model source and 
target. This is important because it defines the appropriate relationship 
between computational methods and all the other methods commonly used in 
biomedical sciences. On the understanding of computational simulation as 
source and experiments as targets, computational simulations are secondary to 
experiments. In vivo, ex vivo and in vitro experiments are deemed to provide 
access to the phenomena ‘in the world’. This assumes that experiments have 
epistemic priority over computational simulations. This is a position that is 
defended by several philosophers, on the basis of experiments and natural 
phenomena sharing the same matter12; on the basis of the causal interactions 
between experiment and natural phenomena (Giere 2009); or on the basis of 
experiment’s ability to lead to the ‘creation or isolation’ of new phenomena, 
which simulations cannot do because they are based on models that set 
theoretical constraints on the behaviour of outcomes13. Other philosophers 
have argued against the epistemic priority of experiments (Parke 2014, 
Morrison 2009, Parker 2009, Giere 2009), but none has taken apart the 
distinction that leads to the issue of priority in the first place. 
Whereas in many domains computational simulations do not sit side-by-
side with experiments, in biological sciences they more often do. The reason 
may be that there are not relevant mathematically formulated theories in 
biology, as they are in physics, or that experiment is more of the normal way of 
conducting research in biology, in contrast with economics. At any rate, the 
models that drive simulations are not as theory driven as in other sciences 
(Keller 2002, Varenne 2010). In biomedical sciences with a real aspiration to 
translational impact in the clinic, in industry, and in other healthcare sectors, 
they must sit side by side with experiments, or fail to gain any traction in the 
area. In this situation, the driver of simulation research programmes is to 
become integrated with experiments. A viable biomedical programme to 
develop computational simulations that are useful (and will actually be used, 
which is just as important, but a separate matter) needs experimental data sets 
that are specifically produced for the purposes of model construction. The 
simulation techniques that are deployed need to be attuned to a deep 
knowledge of the biology and physiology of the phenomena in question, and 
 
12 For example, Guala (2002) and Morgan (2005). 
13 Morgan. 2005. op cit, 326.  
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can never simply be deduced for the model equations14. Parameter fitting and 
data calibration for the simulations need to be carried out in ways that are 
sensitive to experimental ranges15. The visualised outcomes of the simulation 
need to be rendered so as to be in visual affinity with the outcomes of 
experiments; if visualisation is deemed to be too ‘subjective’, validating metrics 
similarly need to be established in the interplay between model, simulation and 
experiment. Validating experiments need to be carried out in line with the 
requirements of the simulation. At this point, experiments are not autonomous 
but designed for the simulation, or there would not be criteria for comparing 
the computational simulation and the experiment, or for testing the predictions 
made by the simulations. Once these three elements become so closely 
intertwined with each other, they are no longer discrete entities, but rather 
interconnected parts of the system. Rather than a model source consisting of 
model and simulation on one hand, and experiment on the other, we have a 
model-simulation-experiment system, or MSE-system16, in which each of the 
parts is defined in interrelationship with the others. What this means is that 
essential features of each, such as the research question addressed, the 
methods, the parameters and parameter ranges, the rendering of outputs, 
analysis and interpretation of outcomes, are defined in the inter-relationship. 
In such a system the question of epistemic priority falls away. It is the system as 
a whole that investigates the phenomenon or domain. Direct access is not 
reserved for experiments alone since the experiments are what they are in 
virtue of their relationship with models. Modeling and simulation can bring 
experiment into question as much as experiments can bring models into 
question; for example they can provoke a re-examination of research questions 
and hypotheses. M, S & E form an inter- connected system that must be 
holistically interpreted and evaluated. 
4. Mediation and the Development of MSE-Systems 
The MSE-system is not born all at of once; by virtue of being a system it takes 
time to develop. Iteration is a term that crops up often, underscoring the trial 
 
14 In this paper, I have not dealt with verification, under which the derivation of the simulation from the 
model equations is at issue. See Morrison (2015). 
15 Carusi, 2014, op cit.  
16 Carusi, Rodriguez and Burrage 2013. 
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and error nature of the process and crucially, its temporality. It is not only a 
matter of models, simulations, and experiments becoming hooked up into a 
system, but of modellers, simulators, experimenters. The following is an 
example of how this hooking up occurs. In cardiac electrophysiology, 
modellers and simulators are setting up collaborations with clinicians that will 
allow them to explore drug actions in a complementary way – that is, beginning 
to establish MSE-systems that will work across the academia / clinic boundary. 
As in academic laboratories, a typical methodology for clinicians in this domain 
are voltage clamp experiments, that control the flow of conductances across the 
ion channels of the cell membrane. Voltage experiments typically involve the 
kind of apparatus shown in Figure 2. Computational modelling and simulation 
instead typically involve apparatus such as PCs, software packages such as 
Matlab, Fortran, simulations packages such as CHASTE 
(http://www.cs.ox.ac.uk/chaste/); mark up software such as CellML, and 
depending on the complexity of the simulation, supercomputing resources. Just 
by the apparatus involved, it is clear that there is a huge difference in the research 
activities that the different people in this area undertake on a daily basis. 
Figure 2: Voltage Clamp Apparatus Two Electrode Voltage Clamp Apparatus. From 
https://www.warneronline.com/product_info.cfm?name=TEV-700+Two+Electrode 
+Voltage+Clamp+Workstation&id=170. 
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The following is an extract from my fieldwork in this area; a doctoral 
student co-supervised by a clinician and a computational modeller, the co-
supervision itself being one of the building blocks of the collaboration. The co-
supervision provides the institutional infrastructure for the exchange between 
clinical laboratory and computational laboratory to occur; and itself emerges 
out of many discussions and social interactions. We are very much ‘in the 
middle’ of MSE development, already mediated. 
Excerpt 1 
Research Participant [RP] Because in this model, after 100 or 200 beats of 
pacing there was a drift in these concentrations. So the very first beat may look 
like this, and second like that ... there’s substantial drift. So there was a 
suggestion to clamp those concentrations and I said to myself why not? And I 
did. [laughs] 
AC: so how do you clamp? This comes from experimental protocols doesn’t it 
[...]  
RP: What I mean by that .. there is as set of equations whereby if you write 
down the derivative of any of these concentrations, there is something here, 
usually some sort of expression, but if you set that to 0 –[see figure 3] sorry, at 
that point this concentration has to be constant-- ... so that’s what I did  
Figure 3: The equation written down in the context of interview, relating to how the 
model equations convey voltage clamp experiment. 
 
AC: so that’s what constitutes clamping? 
RP Yes.  
AC: And is it an equivalent of clamping in an experiment? Does it map onto the 
clamping in an experiment? ..... Is it to say, this is as though I were clamping in 
the experiment? 
RP: [referring to another researcher] thinks yes, I think no, and we disagree on 
that [laughs] ... so I disagree with it personally because, you know, when I 
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imagine a cell and I know that even if the cell, well you know, in experiment 
what you typically do is you do a voltage clamp. At that point you hold the 
voltage constant and then you apply some rapid steps to the voltage. And I can 
also do that with my simulations, I’ve done that with my simulations [...] so 
when it comes to voltage clamping I can do that very easily, and there’s a direct 
match between experiments and simulations. But with concentrations, I am less 
inclined to say so. The main reason being that I don’t know if that’s what is 
actually happening in cells. I don’t think it can be happening in the cells. 
Because, essentially, what happens when you record action potentials, from 
cells, in a whole cell patch clamp scenario, you’ve got a cell, right, and you’re 
piercing it with a pipette, and there is some solution that you stick into the 
pipette, and there is also some solution that you have outside. And then you 
apply a small ... you inject a small current in here and you hope that that’s going 
to trigger the action potential.  
AC: Have you ever done this, yourself?  
RP: I have seen it done. I would not have the patience to do that myself, because 
I’ve seen the pain that it requires. Because if your cells die midway your whole 
experiment is ruined. Which is why I’m a computational researcher ... so this is 
kind of speculation essentially, we don’t really have information about what is 
happening to these ionic concentrations inside of the cell and outside of the 
cell. We have a reasonable idea of what’s happening outside of the cell, because 
you have the cell, and it’s sitting in this bath, and you constantly pass this liquid 
through this bath making sure to wash out whatever the cell is excreting. So 
you’re trying to have the constant concentration outside of the cell, that’s what 
you’re trying to do with this wash, which would actually correspond to clamping 
the sodium and potassium and calcium outside of the cell, right? I don’t think 
you can do that inside of the cell even though I’ve done it  
AC: you mean even though you did it in your model? 
RP: Yes  
 
[...]  
 
AC: [...] How important was it for you to go and see how they are doing it?  
RP: Actually very important because there were things that I, well, I’m not an 
experimentalist and I needed to understand what they were doing in the lab so I 
could to the best of my ability here 
[...] So I create these models and then I simulate them in conditions as closely 
resembling experiments as possible. So I match the concentrations of ions 
outside, I match the temperature ... I’ve been trying to match as much as 
possible between experiments and simulations.  
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From these excerpts it is clear that there is labour involved in establishing how 
models correspond to experiments, what in the experiments they correspond 
to in the experiments, a labour that includes within it agreement and 
disagreement with others. The experimental set up, with its apparatus, 
solutions, combinations of organic matter (cells) and inorganic tools (pipettes 
through which solutions conveying conductances pass into the cell) are foreign 
to modellers. Frequently, we hear comments about personal characteristics 
required in order to be an experimentalist – such as patient, or a modeller – 
such as analytic; yet they attempt to grapple with it so as to be able to ‘do the 
best of [their] ability’ in reproducing, not just the data, but the experiments in 
the models and simulation. The modeller re-enacts voltage clamp in the model, 
including even such details as temperature; but even in so doing, is not certain 
that it is a re-enactment of voltage clamp. Whether it will or will not be depends 
on the ongoing iterations of the model and simulation, relative to experiments; 
it depends on whether clinicians, mathematicians and other computational 
researchers accept it as being such, or are not convinced. The group spends a 
great deal of time in discussions among different combinations of people 
defining what is ‘close enough’, ‘good enough’, ‘of interest’. 
The output of the experiments using techniques like voltage clamp is 
commonly in graphical form, produced through a recording of action 
potentials measured by the apparatus on a vertical scale for amplitude and a 
horizontal scale for time. These graphical renderings are also the way in which 
the outcomes of the simulations are rendered. This is ensured by the software 
that already bridges between the experiments and the simulations, setting the 
interpretive frame that makes the outputs of the simulations interpretable as 
graphs of action potentials. These graphs are public renderings of experiments 
and of simulations, and constitute an essential equivalence generator between 
experiments and simulations. They are also a mediating step between other 
visualisations of the simulations, which otherwise do not have any resemblance 
to any visual output from experiments (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: These are all visualisations produced by computational simulations, but the 
two visualisations on the left have no equivalent in experiments; the ECG mediates 
between the computational visualisation and the visual output of experiments.  
 
These graphical renderings are a typical symbolic mediation in this context. 
They are of course tightly connected with their respective technologies.  These 
renderings mediate the interactions around experiments and models in various 
ways: different features of the curve are pointed to in order to draw out 
similarities and differences; at times the quantitative measures are considered, 
for example the exact time for the curve to reach a particular amplitude; at 
other times qualitative features of the curve are focused on, and attention is 
drawn to the shape of the curves. There is negotiation about which points of 
the curve might be used as the basis for making predictions. From such 
negotiations, the design of ongoing work in experimentation and modelling 
takes shape. 
From the preceding, it is clear that the environment of in silico modelling is 
populated by people from many disciplines entering into relationships whereby 
they agree to undertake joint activities, the outcomes of which need to 
persuade all involved that it is worthwhile continuing on the iterative cycle of 
the research. For example, experimentalists (including clinicians) need to be 
persuaded to conduct experiments with a view to modelling and simulation; 
mathematicians and computer scientists need to be persuaded to fit models to 
specific biological and physiological phenomena of interest to experimentalists 
or clinicians. These different communities often have very different 
conceptions of what the validation process consists in and what counts as 
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validation17. Margaret Morrison discusses the crucial role of validation 
experiments in assessing whether simulations are accurate representations of 
the target (in the form of experimental data). Although her formulation remains 
within the paradigm of source and target that I have sought to displace towards 
a more systems way of thinking, validation experiments are certainly a key 
component of the construction of a robust system. Morrison points out that 
validation experiments are independent of the data used to construct the 
model. She goes on to say:  
Validation experiments are designed specifically so that data are sufficiently 
related to code calculations in a specific domain. Unlike traditional 
experiments, where the emphasis is on measurement of processes in a 
controlled environment, in validation experiments the emphasis is on the 
characterisation of the experiment itself, that is, measuring the various 
characteristics of the experiment that are needed for the simulation. 
Controlling the environment is less important than being able to accurately 
specify the surroundings in a precise way so that all the relevant features of the 
simulation model are contained in the experiment. (Morrison, op cit, 272)  
In a translational biomedical programme, there can be no doubt that these 
experiments must be carried out by regular experimentalists and not by 
modellers with their experimentalist cap on, because they need the results to 
be accepted by those who are able to bring these modelling techniques and 
resources into biomedical contexts. However, conducting such validation 
experiments geared towards simulations may be far from the interest or priority 
of researchers in clinics or in pharmaceutical companies. Ensuring that these 
experiments are actually carried out requires an enormous amount of social 
investment in time spent demonstrating the utility and value of collaborating 
with the simulation programme. This is a process of persuasion in which, for 
example, modellers tailor their models to experimentalists’ interests and try to 
communicate them in the terms (and through the symbolic systems) familiar to 
experimentalists18. It takes time and negotiation on both sides to arrive at a 
commonly agreed set of criteria for validation experiments. The labour of 
MSE-system construction is only indirectly that of constructing and testing 
models and simulations; the nitty-gritty of the labour in developing the MSE-
 
17 As amply demonstrated at the recent ‘Models and Validation in Computational Biomedical Sciences: 
Philosophy, Science, Engineering’ workshop, held in Sheffield, December 2015.  
18 See for example, as described in Carusi 2014, op cit.  
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system is actually that of constructing a system of equivalences between M, S 
and E, that form them into a closely interconnected system; it is on the basis of 
this system of equivalences binding the elements together that, paradoxically, 
comparisons between apparently independent models and simulations, on one 
hand, and experiments on the other, are made and interpreted19.  
 
To continue the example of voltage clamp experiments: this technique also 
disturbs the cell membrane and its effects have to be taken account of in the 
simulation techniques and importantly in the interpretation of the outcomes. 
Thus, not only in the equations but in the simulation too, it is not a given, nor 
an assumed accepted fact, how voltage clamping is reenacted. A system of 
equivalences needs to be established for voltage clamping across model, 
simulation and experiment. The system of equivalences allows for a series of 
exchanges of data, methods, and questions, that are as much as feature of the 
social interactions amongst the research cultures as they are of the MSE-
system. The social interactions are not predicated upon any one set of actors in 
the research culture knowing which is the right way; which then must be 
transmitted (in a unidirectional way) to the others. Instead, in order for the 
iterative process of developing the MSE-system to continue, they most 
together establish what counts as equivalent to an experimental technique such 
as voltage clamp, for a simulation to have successfully solved the equations 
including the zero parameter value that re-enacts voltage clamp; for simulation 
interpretation and comparison with validating experiments to have successfully 
accounted for ulterior effects of voltage clamp. Before it is possible to make 
judgements of accuracy, cast in terms of comparisons between outcomes of 
simulations and experiments (see for example, Morrison, op cit, 276), it is 
necessary to agree on what can be deemed equivalent to what. Through the 0 in 
a model equation being deemed equivalent to voltage clamp in experiments, 
model equations and experiments exchange the feature of controlling 
membrane excitability. This is a two-way exchange over the long-haul of MSE-
system construction, as experiments can also take on the voltage clamp 
features of the models and simulations when they are designed with a view to 
the MS part of the system. 
 
19 The notion of ‘system of equivalences’ is derived from Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, arising in many of his 
works, including the essay on algorithms in Merleau-Ponty (1973). See also Carusi 2014, op cit.  
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Establishing a system of equivalences means that discussion of epistemic 
priority between experiments and models/simulations falls away. We can 
reformulate this as follows: the extent to which epistemic priority is still 
discussed among possible collaborators is inversely proportional to the 
likelihood that robust MSE-systems will develop and be capable of becoming 
absorbed into biomedical implementation settings. In addition, talk of 
replacement of experiments by models and simulations falls away: rather there 
is far more of an emphasis on bridging, connecting, creating complementarity 
between different methods. An example is in a recent community-wide 
discussion to develop a vision of how computational methodologies could 
contribute to the further development of human-based approaches, thereby 
obviating several of the problems (mainly epistemological but also ethical), 
with experiments using animals in pre-clinical studies. One of the key 
challenges identified is: 
Complementarity between different approaches requires input and investment 
from the scientific community, who are key to defining the criteria to be met for 
the assessment of drugs and models, through establishing benchmarks, as well 
as through a reconsideration of different methods and approaches to model 
validation. A consensus for how the pharma and biotech industry should 
respond is required and ideally supported by compelling data that draw on a 
retrospective analysis supporting the reasons to change (Rodriguez, Carusi et 
al. 2015). 
I am a co-author of this paper; however my role at the workshop which the 
paper describes was observer only. These points regarding the need to 
establish community based criteria and benchmarks that would enable the 
different methodologies described to be interconnected was a constant theme 
throughout, articulated by the scientists and industry participants. It is this 
kind of work that I understand as that of establishing a system of equivalences 
that engenders MSE-systems. 
In this section, I have argued that the construction of the MSE-system is 
inherently social; what counts as validation, for example, is something that is 
essentially outward looking to people in other research cultures who need to 
recognise the value or potential in some aspect of the other’s practices 
sufficiently to engage with it and get it to the next iteration; this is particularly 
evident in a translational programme such as in silico medicine. Continuing 
development of a MSE-system therefore ensures that the different research 
cultures – including their priorities and concerns – are inscribed into the 
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system via nitty gritty details of practice, such as voltage clamp experiments. 
Establishing equivalences between experiments and models and simulations on 
something like the voltage clamp technique enables these to exchange features, 
and to repeat them across the system, despite their very different technologies. 
The symbolic renderings of the different technologies are an essential 
mediation for these equivalences to be established.  
In summary: the in silico medicine programme of research, development 
and implementation of computational approaches – especially modelling and 
simulation – into biomedical domains depends upon the construction of MSE-
systems, consisting of interwoven models, simulations and experiments. MSE-
systems are hybrid systems connecting up many different forms of research 
activities, and their associated technologies and apparatus. An MSE-system is 
constructed through the labour of establishing equivalences that operate 
systematically across the different modalities of experimenting and simulating, 
bringing them together – we would say, interweaving them into a system. In the 
opening paragraphs of this paper, we saw how the work of inter-relating in 
silico methods with other methods is already evident in the discursive rhetoric 
of the programme, as evidenced in examples taken from the Virtual 
Physiological Human project. It is evident also at the level of scientific labour 
in the form of establishing a system of equivalences between the different 
modalities, which when interconnected, all begin to be co-defined and co-
shaped in relation to each other. The system of equivalences is highly social 
and mediated by the symbolic systems and technologies of the domain. It is 
produced, not found, given or discovered. Indeed it must be co-produced by 
representatives of the different research cultures involved in it, because 
otherwise it will not be accepted. Acceptance is key; without it in silico 
medicine will never develop into anything but the name of a mode of doing 
medicine that might have been. The robustness of in silico medicine is not only 
a matter of following good scientific methods and sound epistemologies; 
indeed there is nothing like ‘good’ and ‘sound’ in this domain independently of 
the communities that form it. Robustness therefore requires attention to be 
paid also to the social, technological and symbolic mediation of in silico 
medicine, in order to understand what are the ways of acting on and through 
mediation that result in greater robustness. This is not something that has yet 
been undertaken in a systematic way. 
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